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A tariff is an important management tool that can be used to assist with efforts to 
improve the delivery of water and sanitation (W&S) services. The pricing of W&S 
services is, however, controversial, and it is important to understand why there is so little 
consensus on water and sanitation tariff issues. There are four main reasons. First, there is 
disagreement over the objectives of water pricing and tariff design. Water pricing 
decisions affect several different objectives or goals of policymakers, often in conflicting 
ways. This means that if one person is looking solely (or mostly) at the consequences of a 
particular water pricing policy in terms of one objective, and another person is looking at 
the same water pricing policy in terms of its impact on another objective, they may reach 
quite different conclusions about the attractiveness of the pricing policy.  
Second, because people do not generally know what it costs to provide W&S 
services, it is difficult for them to judge what is a “fair” or appropriate price to pay. Third, 
there is disagreement over what would actually happen if different water tariffs were 
implemented. The empirical work is often lacking that would enable someone to know 
with reasonable confidence how changes in water prices would affect the quantity of 
water that different customers would use and whether or not price changes would affect 
customers' decisions to connect (or stay connected) to the water distribution system.  
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Fourth, although there is some competition in the water market, there is no market 
test for different water tariff structures. Many tariff structures are feasible and can 
partially accomplish some of the competing objectives of water pricing. There are 
typically an insufficient number of providers of piped water services for customers to 
reject inappropriate tariff structures. Bad ideas thus do not get weeded out of either sector 
practice or policy discussions. Even in different private sector participation arrangements, 
water tariff structures are typically set by the regulatory agency, and the private sector 
operator has to treat them as a given and manage the system as best he can (given this 
constraint).  
The purpose of this paper is to provide the reader with a better understanding of 
the main issues involved in the design of W&S tariffs. Section 2 summarizes the costs of 
providing piped W&S services. Obviously these costs vary widely depending on local 
circumstances, but the presentation of some estimates different components of the costs 
of providing such services illustrates that they are not cheap. Section 3 discusses 
alternative development paths for moving from low levels of W&S service (or no service 
at all) to modern piped services, and shows the costs associated with various incremental 
changes. Section 4 presents the four main objectives of tariff design. Section 5 
summarizes the main tariff options. Section 6 describes the basic ideas of dynamic 
marginal cost pricing in the W&S sector and illustrates how a two-part tariff can be used 
to achieve both economic efficiency and cost recovery objectives. Section 7 discusses 
how subsidies can be best used in the W&S sector to reach poor households. Section 8 
offers some concluding remarks.  
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2. The Costs of Providing Water and Sanitation Services 
A key feature of water and sanitation investments is that they are very capital-
intensive. The majority of costs are incurred early in the life of the project, and the 
subsequent stream of benefits (and revenues) occurs over many years. Baumann and 
Boland (1998) estimate that the ratio of annual investment in the U.S. water industry to 
gross revenues was 0.43 in 1993.
2 Someone (e.g., private investors, government) must 
take a long-term perspective and put large amounts of capital at risk. If future revenues 
are needed to pay for the high capital costs in the early years, investors need assurance as 
to their rights to this revenue stream.  
In contrast, poor households in developing countries tend to have high rates of 
discount (Poulos and Whittington, 2000) and thus short planning horizons. Such 
households cannot easily make the long-term commitments required to pay for W&S 
services. They are also uncertain about the prospects for long-term economic growth and 
their ability to pay in the future. The challenge of W&S tariff design in developing 
countries must be understood within the context of this fundamental mismatch of 
perspectives between investors and consumers.  
In urban areas there is widespread consensus that the long-term goal of W&S 
service providers in developing countries should be to offer 24-hour, potable water 
supply piped into people’s homes, to remove wastewater with a piped sewerage system, 
and to treat this wastewater to a standard sufficient to minimize the environmental effects 
                                                 
 
2 They note, “no other major industry group in the United States even approaches this ratio of 
annual investment to revenue.” 
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of its discharge to surface water bodies.
3 Even in many “rural” communities, households 
aspire to this level of service. The treatment and delivery of water to households, and the 
removal and treatment of the wastewater generated, cost serious money. These costs must 
be paid by someone—either households must pay, or households must receive subsidies 
(e.g., from richer households, industries, donors, higher levels of government).  
Of course, costs vary depending on individual circumstances, and estimates of 
what it will cost to provide a certain level of service may vary widely. Also, most 
investments are incremental in nature. Only rarely would a community incur the costs of 
complete (“full-service”) piped water and sanitation systems at a single point in time. 
Nevertheless, some rough calculations may prove useful for our discussion of water 
pricing and tariff design. The approach here is to present some illustrative average unit 
costs of providing an urban household with modern W&S services. First, I look at 
representative unit costs per cubic meter for different components of W&S services. 
Second, I provide some typical quantities of water that different representative 
households use in a month. Third, I multiply representative unit costs by typical monthly 
household water use to obtain estimates of the monthly economic costs of providing a 
household with improved, piped W&S services.  
The economic costs of providing a household with modern water and sanitation 
services are the sum of seven principal components:  
 
1. Opportunity costs of diverting raw water from alternative uses to the household 
(or resource rents)  
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2. Storage and transmission of untreated water to the urban area  
3. Treatment of raw water to drinking water standards  
4. Distribution of treated water within the urban area to the household  
5. Collection of wastewater from the household (sewerage collection)  
6. Treatment of wastewater (sewage treatment)  
7. Any remaining costs or damages imposed on others by the discharge of treated 
wastewater (negative externalities).   
 
Table 1 presents some illustrative average unit costs for each of these seven cost 
components, expressed in U.S. dollars per cubic meter. The unit costs of these different 
cost components could vary widely in different locations. For example, in a location with 
abundant fresh water supplies, item 1 (the opportunity cost of diverting water from 
existing or future users to our illustrative household) and item 7 (the damages imposed by 
the discharge of treated wastewater) may, in fact, be very low or even zero. However, in 
more and more places these opportunity costs associated with water diversion and the 
externalities from wastewater discharge are beginning to loom large. 
Some cost components are subject to significant economies of scale, particularly 
storage and transmission (item 2), the treatment of raw water to drinking water standards 
(item 3), and the treatment of sewage (item 6). This means that the larger the quantity of 
water or wastewater treated, the lower the per-unit cost. On the other hand, some cost 
components are experiencing diseconomies of scale. As large cities go father and farther 
away in search of additional fresh water supplies, and good reservoir sites become harder 
to find, the unit cost of storing and transporting raw water to a community increases. Whittington: Background Paper on W&S Pricing (1/11/2006)  6  
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There are also tradeoffs between different cost components: one can be reduced, but only 
at the expense of another. For example, wastewater can receive only primary treatment, 
which is much cheaper than secondary treatment; but then the negative externalities 
associated with wastewater discharge will increase.  
The cost estimates in Table 1 include both capital expenses and operation and 
maintenance expenses. The opportunity costs of raw water supplies (item 1) are still quite 
low in most places, on the order of a few cents per cubic meter. Even in places where 
urban water supplies are diverted from irrigated agriculture, the unit costs will rarely be 
above US$0.25 per cubic meter. Desalinization and wastewater reclamation costs will set 
an upper limit on opportunity costs of raw water of about US$1.00 per cubic meter for 
cities near the ocean, but the opportunity costs of raw water are nowhere near this level in 
most places.  
Raw water storage and transmission and subsequent treatment (items 2 and 3) will 
typically cost US$0.30 per cubic meter. Within a city the water distribution network and 
household connections to it (item 4) comprise a major cost component, in many cases on 
the order of US$0.75 per cubic meter. The collection and conveyance of sewage to a 
wastewater treatment plant (item 5) is even more expensive than the water distribution; 
this will cost about US$1.00 per cubic meter, 40% of the total cost. Secondary 
wastewater treatment (item 6) will cost about US$0.35 per cubic meter. Damages 
resulting from the discharge of treated wastewater are very site-specific, but 
environmentalists correctly remind us that that they can be significant, even for 
discharges of wastewater receiving secondary treatment. Let us assume for purposes of Whittington: Background Paper on W&S Pricing (1/11/2006)  7  
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illustration that these costs are of the same order of magnitude as the opportunity costs of 
raw water supplies (US$0.05). 
As shown, total economic costs are about US$2.50 per cubic meter in many 
locations. I emphasize that  costs shown here are not intended to represent an upper 
bound. For example, in small communities in the arid areas of the western United States 
costs of W&S services can easily be double or triple these amounts per cubic meter. Note 
too that these cost estimates assume that financing is available at competitive 
international market rates, and that countries do not pay a high default or risk premium. 
Table 2 presents a reasonable lower-bound estimate of unit costs of piped W&S 
services. Here the opportunity cost of raw water supplies and the damages from 
wastewater discharges are assumed to be zero. Only minimal storage is included, and the 
only intake treatment is simple chlorination. Costs for the water distribution network 
assume the use of PVC pipes and shallow excavation. Wastewater is collected with 
condominial sewers, and the only wastewater treatment is provided by simple lagoons. 
Given all these assumptions, one can manage to reduce unit costs of piped W&S services 
to about US$1.00 per cubic meter. 
How much water does a typical household in a developing country “need”? The 
quantity of water used by a household will be a function of the price charged, household 
income, and other factors. Currently most households in developing countries are facing 
quite low prices for piped W&S services. One can look at typical water use figures from 
households around the world to see how much water one might expect a household to use 
for a comfortable modern lifestyle. For households with an in-house piped water 
connection, in many locations residential indoor water use falls in the range of 110 to 220 Whittington: Background Paper on W&S Pricing (1/11/2006)  8  
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liters per capita per day. For a household of six, this would amount to about 20 to 40 
cubic meters per month (Table 3). At the current low prices prevailing in many cities in 
developing countries, such levels of household water use are not uncommon. Other things 
equal, households living in hot, tropical climates use more water for drinking, bathing, 
and washing than households in temperate or cold climates.  
Assuming average unit costs of US$2.50 per cubic meter, the full economic costs 
of providing 20 to 40 cubic meters of water to a households (and then dealing with the 
wastewater) would be US$50.00 to US$100.00 per month (Table 4), more than most 
households in industrialized countries pay for the same services and far beyond the 
means of most households in developing countries. 
One would expect poor households in developing countries with in-house water 
connections to respond negatively to higher W&S prices: they might curtail use to as 
little as 50 to 60 liters per capita per day. For a household with six members, at 55 liters 
per capita per day, total consumption would then amount to about 10 cubic meters per 
month. The full economic costs of this level of W&S service at this reduced quantity of 
water use (assuming our unit costs of US$2.50 per cubic meter remained unchanged) 
would then be US$25.00 per month per household. At entirely plausible levels of water 
use (110 liters per capita per day), the total economic cost would be about US$50.00 per 
month for the same household. With the unit costs of the low-cost system depicted in 
Table 2, the full economic cost of providing 10 cubic meters per month would be 
US$10.00 per household per month. This estimate should be regarded as a lower bound 
on the full economic costs of piped W&S services in most locations.  Whittington: Background Paper on W&S Pricing (1/11/2006)  9  
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In industrialized and developing countries alike, most people are unaware of the 
magnitude of the true economic costs of municipal water and sanitation services. There 
are several reasons why these economic costs are so poorly understood.  
First, the capital costs are heavily subsidized by higher levels of government, (and, 
in developing countries, by international donors), so that households with services do not 
see the true capital costs reflected in the volumetric prices they pay. Second, in many 
cities tariff structures are designed so that industrial water usage subsidizes residential 
usage; households thus do not even see the full operation and maintenance costs in the 
prices they pay. Third, because many water utilities run financial deficits (in effect 
running down the value of their capital stock), water users in aggregate do not even see 
the full costs of supply. Fourth, most cities do not pay for their raw water supplies:  
typically the water is simply expropriated from any existing water sources (and their 
users) in outlying rural areas. Fifth, wastewater externalities are typically imposed on 
others (downstream) without compensation.  
Sixth, the subsidies provided to consumers of water and sanitation services are not 
only huge, but also regressive. It is often not politically “desirable” for the majority of 
people to understand that middle- and upper-income households, who generally use more 
water, are thus actually receiving the most benefit from subsidies. Tariff designs may in 
fact be made overly complicated in order to offset this reality and appear to be helping 
poorer households (Komives et al., 2005). Most fundamentally, poor households are 
often not connected to the W&S network at all and hence cannot receive the subsidized 
services. Even if they do have connections, the poor use less water than richer households, 
thus receiving lower absolute amounts of subsidy.  Whittington: Background Paper on W&S Pricing (1/11/2006)  10  
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The estimates presented here are intended merely to suggest what W&S costs are 
like in many developing countries. A reasonable question to ask is whether costs differ 
much across countries in the developing world and between industrialized and 
developing countries. Labor costs are obviously lower in developing countries, but 
because  W&S projects are capital-intensive, this cost component has less of an impact 
on total costs than for other goods and services. There are to my knowledge no publicly 
available international indices of W&S project construction costs. To illustrate the 
magnitude of international cost differentials for some related goods and construction 
costs, Table 5 compares costs of rebar, cement, and industrial construction in eleven large 
cities in both industrialized and developing countries. Costs are indeed lower in cities 
such as New Delhi and Hanoi than in London and Boston, and lower costs for inputs such 
as cement and steel will translate into lower costs for W&S projects.   
It is, of course, less expensive to provide intermediate levels of W&S services 
(such as public taps and communal sanitation facilities) than the costs in Table 2 would 
indicate. Monthly household costs for such services are, however, often quite 
considerable, roughly US$5.00 to US$10.00 per month for much smaller quantities of 
water and much lower levels of sanitation services. These costs are often reported to be as 
low as US$1.00 to US$2.00 per household per month, but such accounts often 
systematically underestimate key cost components and rarely reflect the real costs of 
financially sustainable systems. It is also important to appreciate that intermediate 
services impose additional costs on households in terms of extra time spent accessing the 
services and increased “coping” costs for the inconveniences of using off-site services Whittington: Background Paper on W&S Pricing (1/11/2006)  11  
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(Bahl et al., 2004; Pattanayak et al., 2005). Indeed, there is reason to question whether 
intermediate W&S services provide significant health benefits at all (Esrey, 1996). 
 
3. Water and Sanitation Development Paths  
  The high capital costs of water and sewer systems have important implications for 
water prices and tariff design. Decisions on how to price water and sanitation services in 
developing countries are typically made in a dynamic, changing environment. Pricing and 
tariff design decisions made today should not lock households into low-level equilibrium 
solutions that will constrain them from improving their W&S services as economic 
growth occurs.  
In-house piped W&S services are unaffordable today in many cities in developing 
countries, but as economic growth occurs, there is general agreement that this goal is both 
desirable and achievable. It is thus important to consider carefully how pricing and tariff 
design decisions influence the evolution of W&S service provision and the ability of 
managers and planners to upgrade services when economic growth creates the resources 
to make this vision a reality. There are numerous strategies or “development paths” for 
moving from a situation where households have poor or no services to modern W&S 
services, and it is necessary to reflect explicitly on the pros and cons of each, and how 
pricing and tariff design decisions push service providers and households along a 
particular development path, or create hurdles that must be overcome to make progress. 
For purposes of illustration, Table 6 compares three levels of water services  and 
four levels of household sanitation. Let us consider a household without either improved 
water or sanitation services (Case 1). Within the parameters given in the table, such a Whittington: Background Paper on W&S Pricing (1/11/2006)  12  
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household might progress from this status to full modern W&S services (Case 12) along 
any of four principal development paths.  
  First, some water planners would advocate a “water first” development path (Case 
1 → Case 2 → Case 3 → Case 6 → Case 9 → Case 12): here W&S service providers 
concentrate on first getting piped water services into the household; only after this stage 
is achieved would investments go to the installation of neighborhood sewers and then to 
wastewater treatment. Note that the household itself has important investments to make. 
On the water side, in-house plumbing is required to take full advantage of the piped water 
connection. Similarly, the household would typically be responsible for the installation of 
a private water-sealed toilet, without which the installation of neighborhood sewers 
would be of less value. Proponents of a “water first” development path argue that people 
want water services first and do not recognize the need for removing wastewater from the 
household until water has been provided and wastewater removal has become a problem. 
Also, as described above, sewers and wastewater treatment are very expensive, so it 
makes sense to provide the less expensive services first.  
From a pricing perspective, a “water first” strategy has important implications. 
Under this strategy, revenues for water sales should not be diverted to subsidize sewers or 
wastewater treatment, at least until the majority of the population has high-quality water 
services. Also, any available subsidies from higher levels of government should be used 
to “push” households toward in-house piped service. For example, subsidies might be 
used to reduce the up-front connection charge for a household water hookup.  
  Public health professionals sometimes argue in favor of a second development 
path: “not one without the other” (Case 1 → Case 5 → Case 9 → Case 12). Proponents of Whittington: Background Paper on W&S Pricing (1/11/2006)  13  
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this approach believe that there are important public health complementaries from 
providing improved water and sanitation together, and that households should not be 
allowed to receive in-house piped water without hooking up to a sewer line. Engineers 
often point out that it is cheaper to install water and sewer lines at the same time, 
particularly in cities where this may entail tearing up streets, sidewalks, and other 
infrastructure. 
  Such “bundling” of W&S services has important implications for tariff design. If 
households are required to have sewer services when they receive piped water services, 
then from a household’s point of view, W&S services cannot really be charged 
separately.
4 If the service provider attempts to recover the full costs of both services, and 
the household is willing to pay the cost of the water services but unwilling to pay for the 
sanitation services, the household will reject the entire bundle. Thus when services are 
bundled and tariffs are designed to recover the costs of service, tariffs can easily become 
a barrier to the provision of full modern services (Case 12). 
  A third development path might be termed “sanitation first” (Case 1 → Case 4 → 
Case 5 → Case 8 → Case 9 → Case 12). The rationale here is that improved sanitation is 
a more important first step than improved water services in achieving the desired public 
health benefits. Thus if resources are limited, public authorities should tackle sanitation 
problems before building piped water distribution networks. From a pricing perspective, 
if demand for improved sanitation services turns out to be low, this development path 
                                                 
 
4  Note also that W&S service providers cannot practically meter the amount of water that a 
household receives separately from the amount of wastewater that it discharges. Thus even if a provider 
claims to calculate water and wastewater charges separately, and apply a separate volumetric charge to 
each flow, from the household’s perspective this is simply an accounting trick. The household effectively 
faces a single weighted volumetric rate for the combined service. 
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requires more initial subsidies, with revenues from water to follow when households 
eventually receive in-house water connections. 
  A fourth set of development paths might be termed “demand-driven” in that the 
paths are not selected by “experts” but rather by people themselves. There are numerous 
plausible development paths that households might choose (e.g., Case 1 → Case 3 → 
Case 6 → Case 9 → Case 12; or Case 1 → Case 6 → Case 9 → Case 12). If households’ 
preferences are allowed to shape the evolution of W&S services, prices and tariff design 
have an especially important role to play. Prices provide the signals about the real 
resource costs of the various steps from the status quo to full modern services. If these 
signals are incorrect, households may take an unwanted or unnecessary “detour” on the 
road to Case 12. 
 
4. Objectives of Tariff Design 
  Setting water (and sanitation) tariffs requires that one strike a balance between 
four main objectives.
 5 
  Cost Recovery. From the water supplier’s point of view, cost recovery is the main 
purpose of the tariff.
6  Cost recovery requires that, on aggregate, tariffs faced by 
consumers should produce revenue equal to the financial costs of supply. Moreover, the 
revenue stream should be relatively stable and not cause cash flow or financing 
difficulties for the utility. 
                                                 
 
5 This section draws heavily on Boland (1993) and Whittington, Boland, and Foster (2002). 
 
 
6 For example, the World Bank's Operational Manual Statement No. 3.72 emphasizes the 
importance of this cost recovery objective and the financial autonomy of the borrower.  
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  Economic efficiency. Economic efficiency requires that prices be set to ensure that 
customers face the avoidable costs of their decisions. In other words, prices should signal 
to consumers the financial, environmental, and other costs that their decisions to use 
water impose on the rest of the system and on the economy. In practice, this means that 
the volumetric charge should be set equal to the short-run marginal social cost of bringing 
one additional cubic meter of water into a city, delivering it to a particular customer, 
collecting and treating the wastewater, and discharging the treated wastewater into a 
receiving water body. In many cities, the cost of bringing in additional water is higher 
than the cost of supplying the water already on hand, as the cheapest sources tend to be 
developed first. The short-run marginal cost should include not only the financial cost of 
public works undertaken but also the social cost of diverting water resources into public 
supply rather than using it for other purposes. An efficient tariff will create incentives 
that insure, for a given water supply cost, that users obtain the largest possible aggregate 
economic benefits.  
  Equity. The term “equity” is often used to denote quite different things. Here I use 
it to mean that the water tariff treats similar customers equally, and that customers in 
different situations are not treated the same. This usually means that users pay monthly 
water bills that are proportionate to the costs they impose on the utility by their water use.  
  Affordability. One objective of tariff design is to ensure that poor households are 
able to obtain adequate supplies of clean water. The terms “equity,” “fairness,” “poverty 
alleviation,” and “affordability” are often used interchangeably to express this desire. I 
prefer to treat “affordability” as an objective distinct from “equity,” “fairness,” and 
“poverty alleviation,” because a W&S tariff that is affordable may not be equitable or Whittington: Background Paper on W&S Pricing (1/11/2006)  16  
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perceived as fair. Moreover, an affordable tariff may not pull poor households out of 
poverty. Many people feel that water services are a "basic right" and should be provided 
to people regardless of whether they can pay for them. These considerations have led to 
recommendations that W&S tariffs be kept low and that water be provided free or at 
minimal cost, at least to the poor, through systems of subsidies.  
  There are a number of tradeoffs between these different objectives and the W&S 
tariffs used to calculate customers’ bills. For example, providing water free through 
private connections in order to achieve the objective of affordability conflicts with the 
objectives of cost recovery and efficient water use. Also, poor customers can sometimes 
be relatively expensive to serve (e.g., due to outlying location), and hence it might not be 
regarded as equitable to charge them the same as, or less than, other customers. 
  Additional objectives and considerations may be involved. For example, a tariff 
design should be easy to explain, understand, and implement. A tariff design should be 
acceptable both to the public and to political leaders. This may require the tariff to 
conform to perceptions of fairness, often quite different from notions of equity. Water 
tariffs may be designed to discourage “excessive” uses of water, thus promoting water 
conservation, where “excessive” may be understood as a deviation from some notion of a 
“fair” amount. 
  A successful W&S tariff design should not be controversial, nor should it become 
a focus of public criticism of the water supply agency. Human beings are, however, 
acutely sensitive to situations perceived to be unfair, and fairness is often in the eye of the 
beholder. It can prove to be especially difficult to design a W&S tariff that is perceived to 
be fair when customers do not understand the true resource costs of providing modern Whittington: Background Paper on W&S Pricing (1/11/2006)  17  
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water and sanitation services. Consider the four cases in Table 7. If household members 
understand the real resource costs of supplying modern W&S services and believe the 
household should pay a share of these costs proportionate to its use of such services 
(Case A), a W&S tariff that is perceived to be fair can be relatively easily designed. But 
if household members do not understand the real resource costs of supplying modern 
W&S services, it may prove difficult for them to believe that a tariff is fair even if they 
believe the household should pay a share of these costs proportionate to its use of such 
services (Case B). For example, such a household may perceive a proposed W&S tariff to 
be “price gouging” even if it is not.  
  On the other hand, household members may understand the real resource costs of 
supplying modern W&S services but not believe the household should pay a share of the 
costs proportionate to its use of such services (Case C). This may be because of past 
injustices, a feeling that this household is more deserving of help than others, or any 
number of reasons. Or household members may neither understand the real resource costs 
of supplying modern W&S services, nor believe the household should pay a 
proportionate share of the costs proportionate to its use of such services (Case D). This is 
the most difficult situation for all stakeholders, and unfortunately it is quite common. In 
Case C and especially in Case D, the negotiation of W&S tariffs often becomes a political 
problem largely unrelated to the costs of service delivery. 
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5. Tariff Structures–the Alternatives  
  A tariff structure is a set of procedural rules used to determine the conditions of 
service and the monthly bills for water users in various categories.
7 Table 8 presents a 
simple classification of the different types of water tariff structures. Two main types of 
tariff structures are used in the municipal water supply sector: a single-part tariff and a 
two-part tariff. With a single-part tariff, a consumer's monthly water bill is based on a 
single type of calculation. With a two-part tariff, a consumer's water bill is based on the 
sum of two calculations. The single type of calculation used in a single-part tariff can be 
one of two kinds: a fixed charge or a water use (volumetric) charge; volumetric charges 
can be handled in several different ways. 
  Figure 1 illustrates how the price of water to the consumer changes as the quantity 
of water used increases for some of these tariff structures. Figure 2 shows how the 




  Fixed charges. In the absence of metering, fixed charges are the only possible 
tariff structure. With a fixed charge the consumer's monthly water bill is the same 
regardless of the volume used. In many countries renters in multi-story apartment 
buildings have unmetered connections to their units and thus effectively pay a fixed 
charge for water (perhaps incorporated into the rent). Fixed charges are still quite widely 
used in industrialized countries, such as Canada, Norway, and the United Kingdom (and 
                                                 
 
7 This section draws heavily on Whittington, Boland, and Foster (2002). 
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until recently in New York City), where water has historically been abundant and hence 
metering is not widespread. 
   The fixed charge itself can vary across households or consumer classes depending 
on characteristics of the consumer. For example, historically a common way to charge 
differential fixed charges was to set higher fixed charges on more valuable residential 
properties, sometimes on the assumption that people living in higher-value dwellings tend 
to use more water and/or have a greater ability to pay for the water they use. It was also 
common to assign businesses a different fixed charge than households, on the assumption 
that firms use more water than households, and notions of fairness (e.g., that firms have a 
greater ability to pay for water than households). Another common approach is to charge 
different monthly fees depending on the diameter of the pipe used by the customer to 
connect to the distribution system (Lauria and Hopkins, 2004): single-family domestic 
connections generally require a smaller bore than connections for larger concerns (e.g., 
businesses, hospitals, apartments). 
  From the perspective of economic efficiency, the problem with a fixed-charge 
system is that consumers have no incentive to economize on water use, as using more 
water will not increase their water bill. If the short-run marginal cost of supply is very 
low due to excess capacity in the system, this may not be a big problem. However, from a 
cost recovery perspective, a fixed-charge system creates a potentially large problem for 
the utility (or operator) if some households still lack individual connections: customers 
that do have a connection can supply water to other users (e.g., unconnected households, 
vendors) without incurring an increase in the household water bill. Moreover, because the 
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provided sufficient revenues at one point in time will become increasingly inadequate as 
the economy and incomes grow and water use increases. W&S service providers will be 
reluctant to expand coverage because more customers may mean more financial losses. 
Fixed-charge tariffs are thus especially prone to locking communities into low-level 
equilibrium traps of few customers, low revenues, and poor service (Whittington et al., 
1990). 
  Volumetric charges. The second way to structure a single-part tariff is to base 
consumers’ water bills on the amount of water they use. In mathematical terms, the 
monthly water bill is thus a function of the quantity of water a consumer uses. The 
precise formula used for the calculation of the water bill can differ. There are three main 
options: (1) a uniform volumetric charge; (2) a block tariff where the unit charge is 
specified over a range of water use for a specific consumer, and then shifts as use 
increases; and (3) an increasing linear tariff whereby the unit charge increases linearly as 
water use increases. All volumetric charges require that the consumer has a metered 
connection and that this meter works reliably and is read on a periodic basis. 
Uniform volumetric charge. With a uniform volumetric charge, the household's 
water bill is simply the quantity used (e.g., cubic meters) times the price per unit of water 
(e.g., US$ per cubic meter). This is the most common type of volumetric charge among 
water utilities in the United States, Australia, and a number of European countries and is 
also very common for industrial and commercial users throughout the world. A uniform 
volumetric charge has the advantage that it is easy for the consumer to understand, in part 
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point of view, it can be used to send a clear, unambiguous signal about the short-run 
marginal cost of using water.  
Block tariffs. Block tariffs come in two main varieties: increasing and decreasing. 
They create a stepwise price structure as illustrated in Figure 1. With an increasing block 
tariff (IBT), consumers incur a low volumetric per-unit charge (price) up to a specified 
quantity (or “block”); for any additional water consumed, they pay a higher price up to 
the limit for a second block, even higher for the third, and so on. IBTs are widely used in 
arid areas such as Spain and parts of the Middle East, where water resources have 
historically been scarce. The use of IBTs is also widespread in many developing 
countries in Latin America and Asia. With a decreasing block tariff (DBT), on the other 
hand, consumers face a high volumetric charge up to the specified quantity in the first 
block, pay less per unit for additional water up to the limit for second block, then less still 
for the third, and so on.
8 
                                                 
 
 
8 Thus for both an increasing and a decreasing block tariff structure, the water bill is calculated in 
the following manner: 
 
Let Q* = amount of water sold to a specific consumer, 
Q1 = maximum amount of water that can be sold in the first block at price P1, 
Q2 = maximum amount of water than can be sold to a consumer in the second 
 block at P2, 
Q3 = maximum amount of water than can be sold to a consumer in the second 
 block at P3. 
  
If Q* < Q1, then the consumer's water bill = (Q*) P1. 
If Q1 < Q* < Q2, then the consumer's water bill = P1Q1 + (Q* – Q1)P2. 
If Q1 + Q2 < Q* < Q3, then the consumer's water bill = P1Q1 + P2Q2 + (Q* – (Q1+Q2))P3. 
 
And so on for however many blocks there are in the tariff structure. 
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  The rationale commonly given for an IBT structure is that, in theory, it can 
achieve three objectives simultaneously. It promotes affordability by providing the poor 
with affordable access to a “subsistence block” of water (the “lifeline” rate). It can 
achieve efficiency by confronting consumers in the highest price block with the marginal 
cost of using water. And it can raise sufficient revenues to recover costs.
9 
  The IBT structure has become so widely used in both OECD and developing 
countries that many professionals working in the water sector assume that it must always 
be the most appropriate tariff structure. This is not the case. In practice, IBTs often fail to 
meet any of the three objectives mentioned above, in part because they tend to be poorly 
designed. An IBT may provide more expensive water to poorer households than to richer 
households, because in many cities the poor share connections, and in such cases the 
resulting higher volumetric use in turn results in higher prices for most of the water that 
those households consume.
10 Many IBTs also fail to achieve cost recovery and economic 
efficiency objectives, usually because the upper consumption blocks are not priced at 
sufficiently high levels and/or because the first subsidized consumption block is so large 
that almost all residential consumers never consume beyond that level. 
  The DBT structure was designed to reflect the fact that when raw water supplies 
are abundant, large industrial customers often impose lower average costs because they 
enable the utility to capture economies of scale in water source development, 
transmission, and treatment. Also, large industrial users typically take their supplies from 
                                                 
 
 
9 Note that this argument assumes that the marginal cost of water is in fact higher than the first 
block price. But if a large expansion project has been recently completed, the short-run marginal cost of 
water may be very low. 
 
 
10 See. e.g., Whittington (1992), Boland and Whittington (2000), and Komives et al. (2005). 
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the larger trunk mains and thus do not require the expansion of neighborhood distribution 
networks. Although it is still used in some communities in the United States and Canada, 
the DBT has gradually fallen out of favor, in part because short-run marginal costs, 
properly defined, are now relatively high in some parts of the world, and there is thus 
increased interest in promoting water conservation by the largest customers. The DBT 
structure is also often politically unattractive because it results in high-volume users 
paying lower than average water prices.  
Increasing linear tariff. The increasing linear tariff structure is rarely used. It is of 
interest largely because it illustrates that there are many ways that the water bill can be 
related to the quantity of water used. In this tariff structure, the price that a consumer 
pays per unit increases continuously (rather than in block increments) as the quantity of 
water used increases.
11 This tariff structure sends the consumer a powerful signal that 
increased water use is costly. Not only is each additional unit of water used sold at a 
higher price, but all the preceding units are sold at the last (high) price. A related but 
different tariff structure would require that only the last unit used would be sold at the 
highest price; other units would be sold at the price associated with that lower quantity.  
It is important to recognize, however, that an increasing linear tariff cannot send 
the proper economic signal to a consumer about the short-run marginal cost of additional 
water use. This is because the utility’s short-run marginal cost of providing water does 
not change appreciably as the water use of an individual household changes. An 
increasing linear tariff would thus be especially inappropriate if applied to large-volume 
                                                 
 
 
11 In other words, water bill = (Q*)P*,where Q* = amount of water sold to a specific consumer; 
and P* = α1 + α2 Q* and α1 and α2 are positive constants.  
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industrial or commercial water users because it could drive the price they confront for 




  With a two-part tariff, the consumer's water bill is based on the sum of two 
calculations: (1) a fixed charge, and (2) a charge related to the amount of water used. 
There are many variations in the way these two components can be put together. The 
fixed charge can be either positive (a flat fee) or negative (a rebate). The water use charge 
can be based on any of the volumetric tariff structures described above (a uniform 
volumetric tariff, an increasing or decreasing block tariff, or an increasing linear tariff.) 
In many cases, the fixed charge is kept uniform across customers and relatively low in 
value, and is used simply as a device for recovering the fixed administrative costs 
associated with meter reading and billing that are unrelated to the level of water 
consumption. 
 
Seasonal and Zonal Water Pricing 
  In some circumstances the short-run marginal costs of supplying water to 
customers may vary by season. For example, a community may have relatively plentiful 
water supplies in the rainy season, but much more limited supplies in the dry season; 
water storage (reservoir capacity) will also be a factor. In such cases, it makes economic 
sense for water tariffs to reflect the varying circumstances. By charging higher rates in 
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customers that the water supply is not constant across the seasons, and that the costs of 
maintaining and distributing the water supply may vary as well. The higher dry season 
rate also serves as a reminder that each user’s consumption of water reduces the amount 
available for others.  Chile is one of the few developing countries that currently uses 
seasonal water tariffs. 
  Similarly, it may cost the water utility more to deliver water to outlying 
communities due, for example, to increased pumping costs for higher elevations or more 
distant settlements. A zonal water pricing structure charges users who live in such areas 
more for their water because it costs the utility more to serve them. Zonal prices can be 
used as an economic signal to users that living in such areas involves substantially higher 
water supply costs and that such information should be factored into customers’ 
locational and water use decisions. However, this practice is comparatively rare, in part 
because it requires the water supplier to collect detailed geographically referenced 
accounting information. And this type of special tariff is only appropriate if the costs of 
serving the specially zoned areas are significantly higher than for the rest of the 
community. In fact, costs vary among all users, and a practical tariff always reflects 
averaged costs to some degree. 
 
6. Achieving Economic Efficiency and Recovering Capital Costs: Fundamentals of 
Dynamic Marginal Cost Pricing in the W&S Sector 
The high costs of the capital investments necessary to build modern W&S 
systems make the two-part tariffs described in the previous section especially attractive. 
They offer service providers a means simultaneously to achieve economic efficiency and Whittington: Background Paper on W&S Pricing (1/11/2006)  26  
Draft: Do Not Quote 
cost recovery objectives and also to simplify the design of subsidies to aid poor 
households. Economic appraisal of W&S investments requires that stakeholders first 
determine the optimal price to charge for services, if the services are provided, and then 
determine whether the benefits are greater than the costs if this optimal price is charged. 
For large capital projects with no constraints on raw water supply, this volumetric charge 
(one component of a two-part tariff) may in some circumstances be very low because 
short-run marginal costs can be very low.
12 Such a price will result in large financial 
                                                 
 
12 The economic logic for setting price equal to the short-run marginal cost is straightforward (see, 
for example, Layard and Walter, 1978, pp. 171-176). Consider a community with an inverse demand curve 
for W&S services p = β1 – β2x, where p = price of the services, x is the quantity of W&S services that can 
be supplied per time period, and β1 and β2 positive coefficients. 
 
Let C equal the fixed costs per period of the W&S system, which is by definition assumed not a function of 
x. The investment is able to provide an amount of water Qc per perod, where β1/β2 is less than Qc. Net 
benefits are maximized when the optimal quantity of W& services x* is provided… 
                                                        x* 
Total Benefits – Costs = ∫ (β1– β2x)dx – C 
                
0      
            =  β1x – ½ β2x
2 
      
                d(B – C)/dx  =  β1 – β2x = 0 
 
       x* = β1/β2 
 
Solving for the price that will achieve this optimal quantity, we see that the price should be set equal to zero 
(the short-run marginal cost)  
 
p = β1 – β2x* 
p = β1 – β2 (β1/β2) = 0. 
 
If the price is set equal to zero to ensure customers receive the optimal quantity x*, the benefits of the 
project exceed the costs if  
                      
Total Benefits  > Costs  
 
  β1/β2 




       ½ β1
2 / β2  > C. 
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deficits unless a fixed charge for capital recovery and other fixed costs is also imposed 
(the other component of a two-part tariff).  
The principles that a W&S service provider should follow to determine the 
volumetric and fixed-charge components of a two-part tariff in different circumstances 
have not been well understood in the water resources community. The key point is that 
short-run marginal costs change depending on the regional water resources situation, and 
both the volumetric and the fixed-charge components of the two-part tariff must change 
in response to changes in short-run marginal costs. A simple example can illustrate this 
point.  
Consider a community without a modern W&S system that is thinking about 
undertaking a new project to develop such an infrastructure along with arranging a new 
source of raw water supply. The various stakeholders consider the benefits and costs of 
such an infrastructure improvement and decide that the project is desirable (benefits 
exceed the costs). Assume that capital for this project is not available from a higher level 
of government or a donor agency; the city instead borrows the necessary funds from a 
bond market, promising to repay the loan from new revenues available from the sale of 
W&S services. The citizens of the community agree to allocate the responsibility for 
repaying this loan among all who use the W&S services. Upon the advice of the 
engineering firm responsible for designing the project, the community decides to build 
excess capacity into their W&S system in order to accommodate future population and 
economic growth. The engineers’ argument is that it is cheap to build this excess capacity 
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Figure 3 presents the situation after this first project is built. The community now 
has the capacity to supply Qc. What volumetric price should the service provider charge? 
Because the short-run cost of supplying additional water to the existing population is now 
low (because the capital costs have already been incurred), the volumetric charge should 
be low. The economic logic is that customers should not be discouraged from using more 
water if such use does not impose increased or significant costs on the W&S supplier or 
neighbors. If a customer derives a benefit from using more water and this use does not 
hurt anyone else, why not permit the additional water use?  
However, the loan must still be repaid, so this consumer must pay a “fair share” 
of the capital costs. How a community determines a customer’s “fair share” is essentially 
a political matter. That decision will not affect the economically efficient outcome unless 
it significantly affects the number of customers who decide to connect to the W&S 
system.  If large numbers of customers decide to disconnect from the system after a 
project is completed and the new tariff structure imposed, in most cases this indicates a 
failure of the planning process.  The voices of these customers were not likely to have 
been heard when the decision was made to build the project. 
A numerical example will help to clarify this argument. Assume that this W&S 
project has an average cost of US$0.75 per cubic meter and a short-run marginal cost of 
US$0.25 per cubic meter. Suppose that if the typical household were charged US$0.25 
per cubic meter, it would use 20 cubic meters per month. In this case the volumetric 
charge would yield revenue of US$5.00 per month (20 cubic meters × US$0.25 per cubic 
meter). However, when the loan repayment is considered, the utility actually “needs” 
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This implies that the fixed charge should be set equal to US$10.00 per month so that the 
utility can recover its average costs.  
In this situation the volumetric price sends a signal that there is more water 
available for households at this low short-run marginal cost if households want to use it. 
The demand curve in period 1 (D1) intersects the short-run marginal cost curve at a point 
far below capacity Qc (Figure 3). Water is relatively abundant, and households, 
encouraged by a low volumetric charge, use lots of water. They pay a significant fixed 
charge in order to repay the capital that they collectively agreed to borrow. In a well-
governed community, households would have been made fully aware of the magnitude of 
the volumetric and fixed charges that would be necessary when they decided (voted) to 
undertake the new W&S project. 
 Assume that this two-part tariff structure stays in place and that over time the 
population and economy of the community grow. As shown in Figure 4, the demand for 
W&S services shifts out and to the right. W&S services actually become more valuable 
to customers, but there is no need for the service provider to increase either component of 
the two-part tariff until point A in Figure 4 is reached, because the loan is being repaid 
and revenues are sufficient to pay the average costs of service. Customers thus enjoy an 
increasing consumer surplus on their W&S purchases. The citizens of this community are 
in effect reaping the benefits of their wise decision to invest in the new W&S project, and 
to include excess capacity into the project design. However, the community can “see” 
that this excess capacity is being used up, and the day is coming when the community 
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The community must then decide what to do before point A is reached, because it 
takes time to develop a new project. Essentially it can either “make do” with the amount 
of water that it has (Qc) or build another water project. Suppose that there is another raw 
water source available to the community, but a project to develop this second source is 
more expensive than the one included in the first investment. Assume that this second 
project would result in a system-wide average cost of US$1.00 per cubic meter. Assume 
that the short-run marginal costs of the combined system (after this second project is 
built) would increase as well, to US$0.50 per cubic meter. 
Suppose that the community decides that this new, second project is too 
expensive (the benefits are less than the costs). The citizens vote against a bond 
referendum to raise money to undertake the new investment. Instead, they will try to 
make do with the water supply they already have. In this case the magnitude of the 
components of the two-part tariff must change, because the short-run marginal cost of 
using water changes. Now the volumetric charge must be used to ration the available 
water supplies, as shown in Figure 5. As population and economic growth proceed, the 
demand curve for water continues to shift up and to the right—but in this case the total 
quantity of water Qc available to the community is already being used by existing 
consumers. The short-run marginal costs must now reflect the opportunity cost associated 
with taking water away from some customers: if one customer increases water use, 
another must decrease water use. The volumetric price of water thus keeps increasing to 
reflect this rising opportunity cost forgone (scarcity rent) and to ensure that the available 
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Suppose that the community allows this process to go on, demand keeps growing, 
and the volumetric price needs to increase from US$0.25 to US$1.00 per cubic meter in 
order to ration the available supply. Assume that if the short-run marginal cost is 
US$1.00 per cubic meter and the service provider charges this price, average household 
consumption falls from 20 cubic meters per month to 12 cubic meters per month. 
Households economize on their use of water because the volumetric price has quadrupled. 
In effect, by cutting back on water use existing customers are leaving water available for 
new customers and new and expanded economic activities. This should not come as a 
surprise to existing consumers, because they themselves voted down the bond referendum 
that would have provided the financing for the second water project. 
Assuming that average costs do not change, the W&S service provider needs 
US$9.00 per month in revenue from the typical household customer (US$0.75 × 12 cubic 
meters). However, the volumetric charge yields US$12.00 in revenues (US$1.00 × 12 
cubic meters). Most people would consider it unfair for the provider to reap “windfall 
profits” from the increase in the volumetric part of the tariff. The provider does not need 
the increased revenue to repay the loan or to pay its financial costs of operation. The 
purpose of the higher volumetric price is not financial, but rather to ration water use 
economically.  
The two-part tariff can be used to resolve this “fairness” problem associated with 
water rationing. The fixed charge should be reduced as the volumetric charge increases. 
Instead of a positive fixed charge of US$10.00, for this example a negative charge 
(rebate) of US$3.00 per month will result in a typical household water bill of US$9.00 
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fixed charge is negative, but this need not be the case.  If the scarcity rent is small, the 
volumetric charge may not be large enough to recover the service provider’s costs, a 
positive fixed charge may still be needed.  
Now suppose that the rationing of the water available from this first project 
becomes an increasing burden on the citizens of the community, and they finally decide 
that it is worthwhile to build the second water project. This new project was projected to 
be more expensive than the first project, but nevertheless they vote to approve a bond 
referendum to finance it, because now they are paying a high volumetric price for water, 
US$1.00 per cubic meter, due to the high scarcity rent, and an increased supply will bring 
greater benefits than costs. Again, the community decides to build in excess reservoir 
capacity, to support further population and economic growth. After this second project is 
finished, what should the tariff be?  
The principles are the same as before: the volumetric component of the two-part 
tariff should be set equal to the short-run marginal cost, which has now risen from 
US$0.25 to US$0.50 per cubic meter. When the new water project opens, the citizens in 
this community are relieved that the constraint on their water use has been relaxed, and 
the volumetric price falls to from US$1.00 to US$0.50 per cubic meter. Assume that in 
response to this decline in volumetric price the typical household increases its water use 
to 16 cubic meters per month. Note that this volumetric price is less than in the previous 
period, when the price was being used to ration supplies, but more than in the first period, 
when the community was smaller and the first water project provided cheap and abundant 
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If the typical household now uses 16 cubic meters and the volumetric charge is 
US$0.50 per cubic meter, the volumetric component of the two-part tariff yields US$8.00 
per month. But this is not enough for the W&S provider to recover its average costs, 
which now include loan payments on the second project. The total average cost of 
providing services is a weighted average of the first and second projects. Recall that this 
is assumed to be US$1.00 per cubic meter. In this case the provider needs US$16.00 per 
month from the typical household (16 cubic meters × US$1.00 per cubic meter). The 
fixed-charge component of the two-part tariff must then be set at a positive US$8.00 per 
month.  
This example illustrates how a two-part tariff can be used to send the correct 
signal to customers about the economic value of water and at the same time address the 
financial needs of the W&S provider. The key point is that the volumetric charge should 
be continually adjusted to reflect the real short-run marginal cost of using water 
(including any opportunity costs associated with forgone uses), and the fixed-cost 
component should be adjusted to meet the financial needs of the utility. It is the 
community’s collective decision to agree (or not) to share the capital costs of the project 
that ensures that the benefits of the project exceed the costs and that the allocation of 
costs is considered fair by most parties. 
Note that regulatory authorities will have an important role to play in the 
establishment of an optimal two-part tariff. Particularly in times of water scarcity, when a 
high volumetric price and possibly a negative fixed charge is warranted, a regulatory 
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adopted. Unregulated private W&S service providers cannot be expected to reduce their 
fixed charge as the volumetric charge increases. 
The major objection to using a two-part tariff in this way is the possible instability 
in the volumetric price for services (in the example above, the volumetric price starts low, 
then quadruples, and then falls again). Some water resource professionals and utility 
managers feel that changing volumetric prices will confuse customers and prevent them 
from engaging in careful long-range planning. From this perspective, price stability is a 
major objective of tariff design. Households and businesses are, however, able to deal 
with changing prices in the telecommunications and energy sectors, so there is reason to 
believe that these fears are unfounded. Two-part tariffs are widely used in 
telecommunications pricing, although the negative rebate is not, because short-run 
marginal costs have continued to fall.  
Note also that in some locations the period during which the volumetric price 
must be used to ration water use may be quite long. As cities need to go farther and 
farther afield in search of new supplies, managing water use with high prices may be 
increasingly attractive compared to incurring the rising capital costs of new projects. If 
the volumetric price of water cannot change in response to changing water resources 
circumstances, it will be increasingly difficult to develop rational W&S pricing policies.  
But what about poorer members of the community? How can they be provided with 
improved W&S services when such a two-part tariff is used? 
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7. Subsidizing Capital Costs; Reaching the Poor 
Any discussion of W&S subsidies should begin with the question “Why do many 
people (both those working in the water supply sector and others elsewhere) assume that 
it is a good idea to deliver subsidies to the poor by reducing the water bills of households 
with private connections?” What is it about a piped water distribution network that makes 
it a good candidate for the delivery of subsidies to the poor? It does not follow that 
because water itself is a basic need, a piped water distribution system provides an 
efficient, effective way to deliver subsidies to the poor. After all, people also have basic 
needs for food, health services, and housing. The relevant question is not “How can piped 
water services be subsidized most effectively?” but “Which subsidy mechanisms reach 
the poor most efficiently and effectively?”  
It is also important to ask how households themselves view the importance of the 
good or service to be subsidized. There is strong evidence that households indeed want 
improved W&S services as their incomes increase; this correlation between W&S 
coverage and household income suggests that these services are “normal” goods. As 
economic growth occurs in developing countries, more and more people are obtaining 
improved infrastructure services. Progress is occurring particularly in China and India. 
Figure 7 shows the percentage of households at different income levels that have four 
infrastructure services (piped water, sewer, electricity, and telephone); the data come 
from interviews with more than 55,000 households in 15 developing countries (Komives 
et al., 2001). What is noteworthy about these households is that at all income levels, more 
people have electricity than have piped water or sewer. Very few of the poorest 
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electric service. As monthly household income increases from very low levels to US$300 
per month, coverage of all of these infrastructure services increases rapidly; above 
US$300, coverage increases at a slower rate. 
The data in Figure 7 should be interpreted carefully. It could be that more 
households have electricity because W&S networks were not available in their 
neighborhoods and electricity was, or because electric service was less expensive than 
W&S service. But in fact, monthly household bills for electricity are almost always 
higher than for W&S service; thus  a comparatively lower cost of service does not 
explain the pattern we see here, where many households have obtained electricity even 
when they do not have piped water. 
Figure 8 shows the percentage of households with different infrastructure services 
at different income levels in Kathmandu, Nepal. All of these households had the option to 
connect to all three network infrastructure services: electricity, water, and sewer. The 
majority of the very poor chose electricity, but not water and sewer. At higher income 
levels the percentage of households with W&S services is also higher, but the percentage 
of households with electricity is always higher still.  
The important point to recognize from these examples is that although water itself 
is a necessity, this does not necessarily mean that people prefer piped water service to 
electric service. Indeed, because water is a necessity, households must already have some 
water source. The question is thus how much an improved source is worth to them. This 
will depend on many factors, but probably the most important is how poor the 
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Water and sanitation planners often present the need for improved services as a 
moral imperative or a basic human right, but given the choice, many households in 
developing countries would appear to want electricity before an in-house piped water or 
sewer connection. In fact, it is unusual for a household in a developing country to have a 
piped water connection and not have electricity. Figure 9 shows how the prevalence of 
different infrastructure “bundles” changes as household income increases. Almost no one, 
at any income level, has only a piped water service. However, many people do have 
electricity and not water. Many households in fact have no infrastructure services at all, 
although that percentage declines rapidly as household income increases. These data 
suggest that although most households would certainly like improved W&S services, this 
is by no means their most important development priority. Given the choice, many 
households would probably prefer to have any available subsidies directed to other 
sectors. 
But suppose that a city’s public health professionals and other development 
experts decide that water and sanitation services are “merit goods” that must be 
subsidized.  How best can this be done? In his memoirs (Yew, 2000), the former prime 
minister of Singapore Lee Kwan Yew insightfully summarizes his philosophy: subsidize 
investment and savings, not consumption. He succinctly states the advantage of the two-
part tariff with respect to making W&S services affordable to poor households. 
Subsidizing consumption by selling water at low volumetric prices without an 
accompanying fixed charge is a never-ending distortion, a signal that continually sends 
customers the wrong message about how expensive the fixed costs of W&S services 
really are. But once the capital costs are sunk, low volumetric prices may be appropriate Whittington: Background Paper on W&S Pricing (1/11/2006)  38  
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to let consumers know the short-run marginal cost consequences of their decisions. This 
logic means that any available subsidies for piped W&S services should be directed to (1) 
lowering connection charges and (2) reducing the recurrent fixed charge component of 
the monthly bill. 
Capital subsidies are of course not without problems. In theory, if the political 
process can ensure that only economically sound public investments are undertaken, 
capital subsidies can both assist poor households and foster economic growth. But capital 
subsidies for infrastructure investments in general, and for W&S investments in particular, 
require disciplined public sector decision making. Such discipline is extremely hard when 
subsidies come from outside the community that is to benefit from the investment. In 
most circumstances a community would be foolish to decline a capital grant for an 
infrastructure project with an associated stream of positive benefits. It is the high initial 
costs that are typically the hurdle to W&S improvements, and if someone else volunteers 
to pay these costs, why not let them?   
In practice it has proved almost impossible for national governments or donor 
agencies to conduct rigorous economic appraisals of W&S projects. Whenever it appears 
that a particular project might not pass a cost-benefit test, water professionals appeal to 
intangible benefits to argue that the investment will in fact pass the test. This is 
particularly the case in the evaluation of rural W&S investments in developing countries, 
where neither donors nor national agencies attempt serious project appraisal of W&S 
projects. As Hirschman pointed out, 
The trouble with investment in social overhead capital (e.g., water 
and sanitation investments) . . . is that it is impervious to investment 
criteria. . . . As a result social overhead capital is largely a matter of faith in Whittington: Background Paper on W&S Pricing (1/11/2006)  39  
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the development potential of a country or region. . . . Such a situation implies 
at least the possibility of wasteful mistakes. (1958, p. 84, emphasis added)  
 
This is precisely what we have witnessed in the water and sanitation sector, where 
“white elephants” and poorly performing projects have been a standard feature of the 
sector landscape (Therkildsen, 1988). When higher levels of government (or donor 
agencies) pay the capital costs of W&S projects, numerous opportunities for rent-seeking 
and corruption arise (Lovei and Whittington, 1993; Olson, 2000; Davis, 2004). 
If subsidizing the water bills of households connected to piped networks is a bad 
idea, what policies can instead or additionally be put into place to protect poor 
households from the rise in piped water bills that will be required for effective 
improvements and reforms? There are in fact a number of regulations or policy initiatives 
that can be coupled with the tariff structure to protect poor customers. The most obvious 
is simply to identify poor households and give them cash assistance to pay their water 
bills. This is essentially the approach now used in Chile. But even without such means 
testing, two sets of appropriate pro-poor policies are available. 
 
Create a well-run system of public taps as a safety net for the poor 
In every locale, W&S providers and regulatory bodies planning to install or 
expand a piped W&S system need to look carefully at any existing system of public 
taps.
13 In many places public taps will become obsolete if and when piped services 
become available: where the majority of households have piped water connections, 
                                                 
 
13 The term “public taps” refers here to a system of fountains in public areas outside of people's 
residences where anyone can go to collect water—perhaps for a per-bucket charge or a fixed monthly fee. 
These public taps do not necessarily need to be run by a public sector utility; they could be efficiently built 
and managed by a private operator. 
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households without private connections will work out efficient ways of obtaining water 
from their neighbors at relatively low cost (Whittington, Davis, and McClelland, 1998). 
This solution depends on improving the piped distribution system so that connected 
households do not have to worry about running out of water themselves if they give or 
sell water to their neighbors.
14   
Public taps may nevertheless still have an important role to play because they may 
serve as a water source of last resort for the very poor. In some cases it is even possible to 
provide water free from public taps without substantially reducing the revenues of the 
water utility. This can occur when the availability of free water from public taps does not 
reduce the number of households desiring private connections for their exclusive use, and 
when only a small number of households cannot afford private connections.
15 One source 
of potential revenue for financing a subsidized system of public taps is the excess 
revenues that are available if the volumetric price of water from private connections is 
higher than average costs.  
 
Preserve options for the poor 
  Poor households are hurt most when they have few options for self-help and when 
others have restricted their choices. In such cases it is common to find poor households 
being exploited. This is as true in the W&S sector as elsewhere. One important way to 
                                                 
 
14 Public taps will become relatively high-cost sources of supply compared to purchasing from 
neighbors, because most unconnected households will have to walk farther to collect water from public taps 
than to obtain it from neighbors, and because the fixed costs of an attendant at the public tap will be large 
relative to revenues if only low volumes of water are sold. 
 
15 This is in fact the situation in many industrialized countries today. Water is often available free from 
public fountains, but the vast majority of households still demand private connections in their residences. 
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protect poor households is to preserve their choices so that local mafia or other rent-
seeking actors cannot exploit them. There are three main things that can and should be 
done. 
(1) Ensure that poor households (and others) can have a private water 
connection when they want it. Pro-poor policies should not trap poor 
households into always accepting a low level of off-site water service. If a 
poor household always has the option of choosing a private connection, when 
they can afford it, there are limits to the degree they can be exploited by rent 
seekers. 
 
(2) Legalize water vending and sale of household water to neighbors. 
Vendors and neighbors with private connections create options for poor 
households: they promote competition in local water markets, limit the reach 
of spatial monopolies, and drive down water prices. The poor will benefit 
most from these lower prices. The system of public taps described above also 
adds to the choices available to poor households, fosters competition, and 
thus protects the poor from exploitation. 
 
(3) Do not give private operators exclusive rights to provide water within a 
service area. Contracts with private operators should not contain exclusivity 
clauses. These limit competition and typically end up restricting poor 
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providing piped water to poor households; they should be permitted to 
operate within the contract areas of larger private operators. 
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
  Two-part tariffs have an important role to play in enabling water utilities 
simultaneously to achieve economic efficiency and cost recovery objectives. If a large-
capacity expansion project has recently been completed, the short-run marginal cost of 
raw water supply may be very low. Economic efficiency requires that water be priced at 
short-run marginal cost. If a two-part tariff is used, however, the necessary revenues can 
be raised via a fixed charge, without distorting the price signal contained in the 
volumetric charge. 
However, in periods of water scarcity (e.g., just before the construction of a water 
supply augmentation project), the situation is reversed. In this case, pricing at short-run 
marginal cost implies that the volumetric charge must include the opportunity cost to the 
user who does not receive water due to scarcity. This “scarcity rent” causes the 
volumetric charge to be relatively high in order to ration the available water supply 
among competing users. Such high volumetric charges may produce revenues in excess 
of financial costs. This can be “corrected” by employing a negative fixed charge (rebate), 
while the volumetric charge remains high enough to send the correct signal to customers 
from an economic efficiency perspective. 
  Such dynamic tariff design will require that W&S service providers, regulatory 
bodies, and public officials provide much more information to customers on the rationale 
behind sound pricing policies. As Hanemann (2005) has observed, it is extremely Whittington: Background Paper on W&S Pricing (1/11/2006)  43  
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difficult for publicly owned W&S utilities to receive permission from political regulatory 
authorities for even modest rate increases, even though such increases are routinely 
granted to other service providers such as cable television. As water resources 
management becomes increasingly complicated, the public must become better informed 
about the challenges for tariff design posed by the high capital costs of W&S services, the 
long lives of the projects, and the tradeoffs between competing objectives. This degree of 
public understanding is unlikely to happen without increasing involvement and 
participation of stakeholders in the water resources planning and investment process in 
general and tariff design and in rate setting in particular.  
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Table 1. Cost estimates: improved water and sanitation services  
                
No.  Cost component    US$ per m
3     % of total 
1  Opportunity cost of raw water supply  0.05  2% 
2  Storage and transmission to treatment plant  0.15  6% 
3  Treatment to drinking water standards  0.15  6% 
4  Distribution of water to households  
(including house connections) 
 
0.75 30% 
5  Collection of wastewater from home and 
conveyance to wastewater treatment plant 
 
1.00 40% 
6 Wastewater  treatment  0.35  14% 




Total  2.50 100% 
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Table 2. Cost estimates: improved water and sanitation services for low-cost option  
  for private water and sewer connections  
 
No.  Cost Component    US$ per m
3 
















5   Collection of wastewater from home and conveyance 
 to wastewater treatment plant (condominial sewers) 
 
0.35 
6   Wastewater treatment (simple lagoon)  0.20 
7   Damages associated with discharge of treated wastewater  
(someone else’s problem) 
 
0.00 
   Total  1.00 
 Whittington: Background Paper on W&S Pricing (1/11/2006)  53 
Draft: Do Not Quote 
 
 
Table 3. Range of estimates of monthly water use (in-house, private connection) 





 per month 
Monthly  
household water use 
55 liters  6 persons  30 days  10 m
3 
110 liters  6 persons  30 days  20 m
3 
220 liters  6 persons  30 days  40 m
3 
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Table 4. Range of estimates of the full economic cost of  
   providing improved W&S services (in-house,  




Average cost = 
US$1 per m
3 




3 US$10  US$25 
20 m
3 US$20  US$50 
40 m
3 US$40  US$100 
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Table 5. Comparison of costs of rebar, cement, and industrial 
  facility construction in 11 cities 
 








London    981    96  850 
Boston  1100    85  915 
Los Angeles    992  135  699 
Shanghai    435    43  592 
Jakarta    528    68  269 
Bangkok    482    63  301 
Hanoi    349    62  409 
New Delhi    600    64  247 
Durban    1028  137  516 
Nairobi     n.a.   n.a.  291 
Buenos Aires    765    82   n.a. 
Source: Engineering News Record (2004).Whittington: Background Paper on W&S Pricing (1/11/2006)  56 
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Table 6. Water and sanitation development paths 
  1. Unimproved 
water source 
(e.g. pond, river) 
2. Improved water        
source outside the 
home (e.g., hand-
pump, public tap) 
3. Improved water 
inside the home 
(private water 
connection or yard tap) 
 











      
 
2. On-site sanitation 
(e.g. VIP latrine,  











3. Water-sealed toilet  
+ neighborhood 
wastewater collection 













4. Water-sealed toilet  
+ neighborhood 
wastewater collection  













a Water costs are not cumulative because having a private connection does not require a public tap or handpump. 
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Table 7. Households’ understanding of supply costs versus agreement to pay  
   a proportionate share of the costs of W&S services: four cases 
 
  A household understands 
the real resource costs of 
supplying modern W&S 
services   
A household does not 
understand the real resource 
costs of supplying modern 
W&S services   
A household believes that  
it should pay a 
“proportionate” share of  






A household believes that  
it should not pay a 
“proportionate” share of  
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Table 8. Basic types of water tariff structures 
 
1. Single-part tariffs 
  A. Fixed charge: monthly water bill is independent of the volume consumed 
  B. Water use charge 
  a.  Uniform  volumetric  tariff 
    b. Block tariff: unit charge is constant over a specified range of water use and then 
shifts as use increases 
   (i)  Increasing  block 
   (ii)  Decreasing  block 
    c. Increasing linear tariff: unit charge increases linearly as water use increases 
2. Two-part tariffs:  fixed charge + water use charge 
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Figure 1. Price of water versus the quantity of water used for selected tariff structures 
 Whittington: Background Paper on W&S Pricing (1/11/2006)  60 






























Decreasing Block Increasing Block Increasing Linear Uniform
 
Figure 2. Monthly water bill versus the quantity of water used for selected tariff structures 
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Figure 4. Second period: demand grows as population and economic 
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Figure 6.  Fourth period: demand continues to grow  
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Median monthly household income in 1998 US$
 % hhs with electricity % hhs with in-house water tap
 % hhs with sewer connection  % hhs with telephone








       Source: Komives, Whittington, and Wu (2003) 
Figure 7. Infrastructure coverage versus household income Whittington: Background Paper on W&S Pricing (1/11/2006)  66 
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 % with sewer connection  % with telephone
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Source: Komives, Whittington, and Wu (2003) 
 
Figure 8. Infrastructure choices versus household income: Kathmandu, Nepal Whittington: Background Paper on W&S Pricing (1/11/2006)  67 
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Source: Whittington and Komives (2002) 
Figure 9. Household infrastructure bundles versus household income:  
Asia versus rest of the world 
 